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Enforcing against state assets: The case for restricting private creditor 
enforcement and how judges in England have used “context” when 
applying the “commercial purposes” test. 
 
Katherine Reece Thomas* 
 
Abstract: This article focuses on some recent cases involving attempts by 
private creditors to enforce judgments against state assets. It examines how the 
international law rules on state immunity which permit enforcement but only 
against assets used for commercial purposes have been applied in domestic 
courts. In particular it highlights an emerging trend in English cases where 
“context” has been used to protect state assets from seizure. It considers 
enforcement against the wider question of sovereign debt restructuring and 
concludes that, apart from a few exceptions, courts are protecting state assets 
despite increased pressure from creditors.  
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I. Introduction 
Most jurisdictions no longer recognise absolute sovereign immunity.  Immunity 
essentially extends to the governmental activities and not to the commercial 
activities of a state. The potential injustice to private litigants of an unfettered 
application of absolute immunity, the increasing involvement of states in 
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commerce and a growing number of sovereign defaults has led to the adoption 
of this restrictive doctrine in respect of suit.1  
In contrast, possible international political ramifications and ingrained notions 
of dignity and equality make it less acceptable as a matter of international 
comity and law to curtail the immunity of a state when its assets are at risk of 
seizure. As a result, states continue to benefit from virtually absolute immunity 
from court-supervised execution or measures of constraint. The one, widely 
accepted, restriction to such immunity is in relation to state assets which are 
being ‘used for commercial purposes’.2 The scope and application of the 
commercial purposes test is however uncertain and merits study.  
Recent sovereign defaults in Argentina and potential defaults in Europe, in the 
aftermath of the financial collapse of 2008, have highlighted the limited right to 
redress in domestic courts afforded to private creditors (traditionally banks and, 
increasingly, bond holders). As there is no international law establishing an 
insolvency regime for states unable to pay their debts, states in default cannot 
go into liquidation, the ultimate escape of the domestic debtor. Creditors of 
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1
 The restrictive doctrine is based on the concept that if a state chooses to engage in commerce it should be 
treated in domestic law as a private commercial entity would be. The restrictive doctrine of state immunity is 
arguably now embedded in customary international law and is reflected in the 2004 United Nations 
Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, Annex, UN Doc. A/RES/59/38 (not yet 
in force). The Convention represents customary law: Jones v Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 [2007] 1 A.C. 270 p. 280,289 and 293 (per Lord Bingham). 
The EuƌopeaŶ CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ “tate IŵŵuŶitǇ ϭϵϳϮ ;͞ECSI͟Ϳ and the UK “tate IŵŵuŶitǇ AĐt ϭϵϳϴ ;͞“IA͟Ϳ adopt 
the restrictive doctrine. Most common law jurisdictions have followed suit: The US Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act 1977, The Canadian State Immunity Act (as amended) 1982 and the Australian Foreign States 
Immunities Act (as amended) 1985 are good examples. However not all states subscribe to the restrictive 
doctrine. Brazil does not and the former Soviet Union did not. China in particular does not accept the 
restrictive doctrine as evidenced by litigation in Hong Kong in FG Hemispheres Associates LLC v Democratic 
Republic of Congo [2010] 1 HKLRD 410 (CA (HK)).  
2
 ‘efeƌƌed to heƌe as the ͞ĐoŵŵeƌĐial purposes͟ test. The liŵits oŶ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt juƌisdiĐtioŶ haǀe ďeeŶ 
explored widely notably in the following: ‘ogeƌ O͛Keefe aŶd ChƌistiaŶ Taŵs, The United Nations Convention on 
the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Properties, A Commentary, (OUP 2013) ;  Xiadong Yang, State 
Immunity in International Law, (CUP 2012); HeƌsĐh LauteƌpaĐht, ͞The pƌoďleŵ of jurisdictional immunities of 
foƌeigŶ “tates͟ 3 Collected Papers ϯϭϱ ;ϭϵϱϭͿ; Jaŵes Cƌaǁfoƌd, ͞EǆeĐutioŶ of JudgŵeŶts aŶd FoƌeigŶ “oǀeƌeigŶ 
IŵŵuŶitǇ͟ ;ϭϵϴϭͿ ϳϱ AJIL ϴϮϬ; Geoƌges Delauŵe, ͞The “tate IŵŵuŶitǇ AĐt of the UŶited KiŶgdoŵ͟ ;ϭϵϳϵͿ ϳϯ 
AJIL 185; Hazel Foǆ, ͞A ͞ĐoŵŵeƌĐial tƌaŶsaĐtioŶ uŶdeƌ the “tate IŵŵuŶitǇ AĐt ϭϵϳϴ͟ ;ϭϵϵϰͿ ICLQ 193; August 
‘eiŶisĐh, ͞EuƌopeaŶ Đouƌt pƌaĐtiĐe ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg state iŵŵuŶitǇ fƌoŵ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt ŵeasuƌes͛ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ EJIL 803; 
CedƌiĐ ‘ǇŶgaeƌt, ͞EŵďassǇ BaŶk AĐĐouŶts aŶd “tate IŵŵuŶitǇ from Execution: Doing Justice to the Financial 
IŶteƌests of Cƌeditoƌs͟ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Ϯϲ Leiden Journal of International Law pp. 73-88;  Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, 
The Law of State Immunity (3
rd
 edn, OUP 2013); ‘osaŶŶe ǀaŶ Aleďeek, ͞DoŵestiĐ Couƌts as ageŶts of 
DeǀelopŵeŶt of IŶteƌŶatioŶal IŵŵuŶitǇ ‘ules͟ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Ϯϲ Leiden Journal of International Law pp. 559-578; and 
GuǇ ‘oďiŶ, ͞EŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt iŵŵuŶities iŶ the doŵaiŶ of iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŵŵeƌĐial tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs͟ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ 
International Business Law Journal, 3.  
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states can either join in an orderly international rescheduling effort or pursue a 
remedy in a domestic court.3There are not many examples of successful 
enforcement actions against state assets partly because most extra-territorial 
state assets are deposited in central banks which benefit in general from 
absolute immunity4 or are held in the name of separate state entities5. The wide 
immunity from judicial enforcement afforded to state assets also explains the 
relatively few cases. But as states have turned to world markets to fund their 
development and financial institutions have been keen to lend, instances of 
sovereign defaults have multiplied and creditors have increasingly sought to 
recover through domestic courts.6 Private creditors, who have successfully sued 
foreign states, have turned their attention to enforcing these judgments against 
state assets in municipal courts. So-called “professional litigators” have 
commenced actions around the world highlighting  the need for clarity in this 
                                                          
3
Lee Buchheit aŶd G.Mitu Gulati, ͞‘espoŶsiďle “oǀeƌeigŶ LeŶdiŶg aŶd BoƌƌoǁiŶg͟ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ϳϯ Law and 
Contemporary Problems 63;
 Paďlo M. ‘os, ͞The Elliott AĐƌopolis? AŶ AŶalǇsis of IŶdiǀidual Cƌeditoƌ “oǀeƌeigŶ 
Deďt EŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt MeĐhaŶisŵs͟ Haƌǀaƌd Laǁ “Đhool “pƌiŶg ϮϬϭϭ available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/education/llm/2010---2011/ros.pdf, accessed 5 February 
2014; Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch aŶd HeŶƌik EŶdeƌleiŶ, ͞“oǀeƌeigŶ Defaults iŶ Couƌts The ‘ise of 
Creditor Litigation 1976-ϮϬϭϬ͟ ;MaǇ ϲ ϮϬϭϰͿ. Aǀailaďle at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189997; JoŶathaŶ BlaĐkŵaŶ aŶd ‘ahul Mukhi, ͞The 
EǀolutioŶ of ModeƌŶ “oǀeƌeigŶ Deďt LitigatioŶ: Vultuƌes, Alteƌ Egos, aŶd otheƌ Legal FauŶa͟ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ϳϯ Law and 
Contemporary Problems ϰϳ; W. Maƌk C. Weideŵaieƌ aŶd AŶŶa GelpeƌŶŶ, ͞IŶjuŶĐtioŶs iŶ “oǀeƌeigŶ Deďt 
LitigatioŶ͟ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϯϭ Yale J. on Reg ϭϴϵ ; W. Maƌk Weideŵaieƌ aŶd Miu Gulati, ͞“oǀeƌeigŶ Deďt aŶd the 
͞CoŶtƌaĐts Matteƌ͟ HǇpothesis͟, foƌthĐoŵiŶg iŶ the Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics ; W. Mark C. 
Wedeŵaieƌ, ͞“oǀeƌeigŶ IŵŵuŶitǇ aŶd “oǀeƌeigŶ Deďt͟ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ U. Ill. L. Rev. 67.   
4
 Central Banks benefit from absolute immunity from enforcement under the UK SIA s 14 (4). William Blair, 
͞The legal effeĐt of CeŶtƌal BaŶk IŶǀestŵeŶts uŶdeƌ EŶglish Laǁ͟ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ Cambridge Law Journal 374. See AIG 
Capital Partners v Republic of Kazakstan [2005] EWHC 2239 (Comm), [2005] All ER (D) 223 on the meaning of 
property and the application of s 14(4) of SIA.   
5
 “epaƌate eŶtities aƌe Ŷot tƌeated as the ͞state͟ aŶd haǀe oŶlǇ liŵited iŵŵuŶitǇ uŶdeƌ s ϭϰ of “IA aŶd as a 
matter of customary international law. In addition their assets cannot be attached to meet the debts of the 
state or other state entities as recently confirmed in the Privy Council case of La Generale des Carrieres et des 
Mines v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2012] UKPC 27; [2013] 1 All E.R. 409; [2013] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 753; 
[2012] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 443; [2012] 2 C.L.C. 709. 
6
 The General Assembly has recently resolved to establish an international legal framework for sovereign debt. 
See the articles on sovereign debt refeƌƌed to iŶ Ŷote ϯ aďoǀe aŶd TosiŶ “uleiŵaŶ ͞AŶalǇsis: DeĐade afteƌ deďt 
ƌelief, AfƌiĐa͛s ƌush to ďoƌƌoǁ stiƌs ĐoŶĐeƌŶ͟ Reuters Business & Financial News, 18 March 2014 available at 
http://www.reuters.com/assets accessed 3rd February 2015; Danny Hakim ͞Investors Are Eager for African 
Sovereign Debt, Despite Plenty of Risks͟ Neǁ Yoƌk Tiŵes, October 23, 2014 7:42 pm; available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/investors-are-eager-for-african-sovereign-debt-despite-plenty-of-
risks/?_r=2; accessed 5th  February 2015.There may be progress towards a new framework to deal with 
soǀeƌeigŶ defaults. “ee ElaiŶe Mooƌe, ͞Neǁ Fƌaŵeǁoƌk foƌ soǀeƌeigŶ defaults͟ Financial Times, August 28, 
2014 at 6.52pm available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/; accessed 1st September 2014. G.A.Res. 68/304, UN 
Doc A/RES/68/304 (Sept. 9 2014) disĐussed iŶ KaƌeŶ HalǀeƌsoŶ Cƌoss, ͞U“ “upƌeŵe Couƌt DeŶies Ceƌtioƌaƌi aŶd 
Affiƌŵs DisĐoǀeƌǇ iŶ BoŶdholdeƌ LitigatioŶ agaiŶst AƌgeŶtiŶa͟ ASIL Insight, October 15, 2014 available at 
Http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/23/us-supreme-court-denies-certiorari-and-affirms-discovery-
bondholder. Last accessed 22 October 2014. 
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complex area.7 An example of recent activity is that led by “vulture funds”, 
entities which purchase deeply discounted sovereign debt in the hope of 
recovering substantial sums against the debtor state and which has resulted, at 
least in the US courts, in some startling moves to permit enforcement against 
state assets and limit immunity.8  
Many commentators in this field have bemoaned the absence of redress for 
unpaid creditors of sovereign states and highlighted failures to recover by 
successful litigants. Fewer have written about why it is important for state assets 
to be protected and why immunity remains a key international mechanism for 
stability9. Is exposing state assets which may be generated by bilateral or 
international aid (for example) to domestic measures of constraint ultimately the 
best way forward? Should assets purchased or built with international aid be 
liable to attachment? Is the “commercial purposes” test the most appropriate in 
these circumstances? As the test may be difficult to apply in respect of certain 
types of asset (notably bank accounts) there is a risk that in the wrong hands the 
test may lead to attachment arguably against international public policy and 
comity.  
It is against this backdrop that this article examines recent domestic decisions 
which suggest that an interesting trend is emerging whereby the English courts 
at least take a wide view of the UK immunity legislation by making reference to 
the “context” in which the litigation takes place which encompasses 
international policy considerations. Courts are taking account of the wider 
concerns by interpreting the “commercial purposes” test in English law by 
reference to the broader international issues at stake which include a traditional 
deference towards foreign sovereigns. As discussed below, this trend is 
replicated in France, in Australia and to a certain extent in the United States. 
                                                          
7
 JoŶathaŶ BlaĐkŵaŶ aŶd ‘ahul Mukhi, ͞The EǀolutioŶ of ModeƌŶ “oǀeƌeigŶ Deďt LitigatioŶ: Vultuƌes, Alteƌ 
Egos, aŶd otheƌ Legal FauŶa͟ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ϳϯ Law and Contemporary Problems 47; and Lee Buchheit and G.Mitu 
Gulati, ͞‘espoŶsiďle “oǀeƌeigŶ LeŶdiŶg aŶd BoƌƌoǁiŶg͟ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ϳϯ Law and Contemporary Problems 63. 
8
 Paďlo M. ‘os, ͞The Elliott Acropolis? An Analysis of Individual Creditor Sovereign Debt Enforcement 
MeĐhaŶisŵs͟ Haƌǀaƌd Laǁ “Đhool “pƌiŶg 2011 available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/education/llm/2010---2011/ros.pdf, accessed 5 February 
2014,   provides some background to the attempts by Elliott Management, Aurelius Capital Management and 
NML Capital Ltd, the so Đalled ͞hold out͟ Đƌeditoƌs to eŶfoƌĐe agaiŶst AƌgeŶtiŶiaŶ assets ǁoƌldǁide. In 
Australia the Court of Appeal of New South Wales has recently upheld the immunity of the Republic of Nauru 
against attempts to attach bank accounts by a bondholder. See part III A below. 
9
 “ee the aƌtiĐles ƌefeƌƌed to iŶ Ŷote ϯ aďoǀe aŶd Daǀid Gaukƌodgeƌ, ͞FoƌeigŶ “tate IŵŵuŶitǇ aŶd FoƌeigŶ 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt CoŶtƌolled IŶǀestoƌs͟ OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2010/02, OECD 
Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5km91p0ksqs7-en accessed on 14/4/14; ‘osalǇŶ HiggiŶs, ͞EƋualitǇ of 
States and Immunity from Suit: A Complex RelatioŶship͟ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 43. 
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In 1984, the English House of Lords decided in Alcom v The Republic of 
Colombia10 that a Colombian embassy bank account in London could not be 
attached by a judgment creditor as the state enjoyed immunity from 
enforcement in respect of accounts not “solely in use for commercial 
purposes”.11 In 2012, the Supreme Court decided in SerVaas v Rafidain Bank 
that monies in an account in London representing a debt due to the Republic of 
Iraq could not be attached because the debt  was not “currently in use” for 
commercial purposes.12 The words “solely” and “currently” are not in the 
relevant legislation but the courts have arguably “imported” them to give effect 
to international policy considerations.13 
Alcom was the first major decision to look at the then recently enacted 
immunity from enforcement provisions of the UK State Immunity Act 1978. 
SerVaas is the latest. This article will examine how in the years between the two 
cases the test for enforcement against state assets has raised questions of 
interpretation which courts have resolved by adopting a   “purpose in context” 
test thus preserving state assets from attachment when it is arguably politically 
or diplomatically inappropriate to allow seizure. English courts, while formally 
endorsing a strict approach to the legislation, have used the “context” in which 
enforcement is sought in much the same way as Lord Wilberforce used 
“context” in connection with immunity from suit at common law in the crucial 
case of I Congreso in which he looked beyond the commercial nature of the 
underlying transaction to the political (or non-commercial) motivation for the 
breach, a test which has become known as the “nature in context” test14. Before 
examining these recent English cases, this article will outline the development 
of the doctrine of state immunity from enforcement in international customary 
law and the domestic law of key states where similar trends have emerged. 
II. Development of the restrictive doctrine of immunity from enforcement 
in International Law 
                                                          
10
 [1984] AC 580. 
11
 Ibid., 604 D. 
12
 [2012] UKSC 40, [2013] 1 A.C. 595. 
13
 As discussed in part III C below. 
14
 Playa Larga (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) Appellants v I Congreso del Partido (Owners) 
Respondents Marble Islands (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) Appellants v Same Respondents (the I 
Congreso) [ϭϵϴϯ] ϭ A.C. Ϯϰϰ, [ϭϵϴϭ] ϯ WL‘ ϯϮϴ. “tephaŶ WittiĐh disĐusses the ͞ĐoŶteǆt test͟ as a ƌefiŶeŵeŶt of 
the Ŷatuƌe test iŶ his Đhapteƌ ͞AƌtiĐle Ϯ ;ϭͿ;ĐͿ aŶd ;ϮͿ aŶd ;ϯͿ͟ iŶ  ‘ogeƌ O͛Keefe aŶd ChƌistiaŶ Taŵs, The United 
Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Properties, A Commentary (OUP 2013) 
69.  
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A. Distinguishing sovereign from non-sovereign acts 
The doctrine of state immunity is justified on the basis of the sovereign equality 
and independence of states.15 Both the commercial activity test, used to limit 
immunity from suit, and the commercial purposes test, used to protect state 
assets from enforcement, rely on it being possible to distinguish between the 
sovereign and the non- sovereign acts of states. The distinction is sometimes 
expressed as one between acts jure imperii (of a sovereign nature) and acts jure 
gestionis (of a commercial nature) with immunity from suit being removed from 
acts jure gestionis. In essence one is called upon to decide when a state is acting 
as a “state” and when it is acting as a commercial entity, the principle being 
that, when it is acting as a trader, a state does not need to be protected from 
domestic law and that it forfeits its right to be treated differently from an 
ordinary man of commerce.16  As a result, state courts generally look to the 
“nature” of the relevant activity or transaction to determine if it is commercial 
or not. By focusing on nature not purpose, domestic courts have allowed suits 
against states to proceed in respect of contracts entered into (or breached) for an 
avowedly political or sovereign purpose, the purchase of boots for the army 
being the paradigm example.17  
However, enforcement action against state assets is essentially limited to the 
pursuit of assets in use for commercial purposes not being a sovereign or public 
purpose. For attachment it does not suffice that an asset has a commercial nature 
(for example a bank account held in a commercial bank of a type any trader 
could open): The creditor must also show that the asset is in use for a 
commercial purpose. In other words, the test for distinguishing state assets 
capable of attachment, or of being subjected to other methods of constraint18, 
from those immune and thus free from judicial interference, revolves around the 
uses to which the relevant assets are being put. If that use is for a commercial 
                                                          
15
 “iƌ MiĐhael Wood, ͞IŵŵuŶitǇ fƌoŵ JuƌisdiĐtioŶ aŶd IŵŵuŶitǇ fƌoŵ Measuƌes of CoŶstƌaiŶt͟, iŶ ‘ogeƌ 
O͛Keefe aŶd ChƌistiaŶ Taŵs, The United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their 
Properties, A Commentary (OUP 2013), p.ϭϰ; ‘osalǇŶ HiggiŶs, ͞EƋualitǇ of “tates aŶd IŵŵuŶitǇ fƌoŵ “uit: A 
Coŵpleǆ ‘elatioŶship͟ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 43 and Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State, ICJ Reports (2012) 99 para 57. 
16
 Put graphically by Lord Denning MR in Trendtex v The Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q.B. 529 [1977] 2 WLR 
356. 
17
 UK State Immunity Act 1978 section 3 and UNCSI article 2. Lord Denning in Trendtex uses this example. Ibid., 
p. 558 at D.    
18
 UNCSI Article 19. Sir Michael Wood iŶ O͛Keefe ;Ŷ.15) p 16. 
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purpose the asset may be attached.19 It is, of course, not always clear what use 
an asset is put to: What for example is the use of a bank account and what is a 
non- governmental or non-public purpose? At the international level, the “in use 
for commercial purposes” restriction in respect of enforcement has been 
problematic and, in many jurisdictions, legislators and contract draftsmen have 
sought to add specificity to the concept.  
B. Immunity from enforcement/measures of constraint in international 
law 
“[I]mmunity from execution has been one of the most contested aspects of State 
immunity, indeed an ‘intractable aspect’”20 and it has not been possible, until 
relatively recently, to point to a customary law exception to absolute immunity 
from domestic enforcement against state assets or the use of “measures of 
constraint”, as the international lawyers describe them. The emerging rule of 
customary international law is expressed in the UN Convention on the 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property 2004 (“UNCSI”) (not in 
force).21 The starting point is always that there is absolute immunity from 
enforcement against state assets subject to exceptions. UNCSI distinguishes 
between attempts by creditors to obtain judicial assistance before obtaining a 
judgment and those pursued after a favourable judgment has been rendered. It 
thus refers to pre- and post-judgment forms of attachment. Assets may be 
subject to attachment pre-judgment only where the state consents or, where the 
property is earmarked in advance for enforcement.22 With respect to post-
judgment attachment, only an asset which is “specifically in use or intended for 
use by the State for other than government, non-commercial purposes and is in 
the territory of the State of the forum” may be attached.23 Article 21 provides an 
                                                          
19
 States may hold a variety of assets overseas including buildings (for embassies, consulates and cultural 
institutes), ships, artefacts, and money in deposit or other accounts with commercial banks. UNCSI Article 21 
sets out a list of property that is not in use for commercial purposes. Guy Robin, ͞EŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt iŵŵunities in 
the doŵaiŶ of iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŵŵeƌĐial tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs͟ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ International Business Law Journal, p. 3 sets out a 
useful analysis of the types of state asset a creditor may wish to enforce against.  
20
 Sir MiĐhael Wood ǁƌitiŶg iŶ O͛Keefe ;Ŷ. 15) p 15.  
21
 2004 United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, Annex, UN 
Doc. A/RES/59/38 not yet in force. The US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1977, The Canadian State 
Immunity Act (as amended) 1982 and the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act (as amended) 1985, The UK 
State Immunity Act 1978.  
22
 UNCSI Art 18. 
23
 UNCSI Art 19 (c) fuƌtheƌ liŵits eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt ďǇ ƌestƌiĐtiŶg the asset ďase to ͞pƌopeƌtǇ that has a ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ 
with the entity against which the proceeding ǁas diƌeĐted.͟ The tƌeatǇ also adds a territorial connection (the 
relevant assets must be within the territory of the state whose court is hearing the application) but does not 
require there to be a link between the asset and the substantive claim. This was contested in the drafting of 
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indicative list of categories of property which are deemed to fall outside Article 
19 (c) which cannot be enforced against without consent, such as embassy bank 
accounts, military equipment, central bank property, and property forming part 
of the cultural heritage of the state.24 Commentators on UNCSI have concluded 
that property can be attached if it is used for the purpose of a commercial 
transaction25. The focus is on the purpose not the nature of the asset but 
determining the commercial purpose of an asset, particularly a bank account, 
remains difficult. 
In 2012, the International Court of Justice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State (Germany v Italy) considered whether Italy had acted in breach of 
international law in denying immunity to Germany, in respect of its alleged 
breaches of international humanitarian law in the Second World War. The court 
considered whether Italian measures to enforce Greek judgments against 
Germany were legally permissible. The court recognised that immunity from 
enforcement “goes further than immunity from suit” 26 and, specified that there 
exist two regimes in customary international law: one for determining 
exceptions from the adjudicative jurisdiction of domestic courts and one for 
immunity from enforcement or measures of constraint.27  
The court looked at Article 19 of the UNCSI and, while not concluding that it 
necessarily represented customary law, was clear that enforcement against state 
assets is permitted if they are “in use for an activity not pursuing government 
non-commercial purposes”.28 
The court considered the status of the German cultural institute (Villa Vigoni), 
used for promoting German cultural interests, against which enforcement 
measures were sought. The court concluded, after looking at German, Swiss, 
Spanish, South African and English cases, that the institute was “being used for 
governmental purposes that [are] entirely non-commercial, and hence for 
purposes falling within Germany’s sovereign functions”. The court referred to 
an exchange of notes between Italy and Germany, dating from 1986, which 
illustrated that Italy was directly involved in the “peculiar bi-national managing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the convention but finally accepted in 2003 and is consistent with the practice of most states other than the 
US. See 1977 US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act s. 1610(a)(2).   
24
 See the discussion in O͛Keefe (n. 14), p.322. 
25
 Ibid., p. 323.  
26
 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, (Germany v Italy), ICJ Reports (2012) 99 para 113. 
27
 Ibid., para 117. 
28
 Ibid., para 118. 
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structures” which applied to the institute. 29 The court did not actually go into 
any detail in looking at “purpose” and seemed implicitly to accept that cultural 
activities were essentially governmental activities and not commercial activities. 
An international court can use international treaty rules flexibly and treaty 
wording is often deliberately vague to enable such flexibility. The UNCSI test 
focuses on non-government commercial purposes and is somewhat vaguer than 
the test in the UK State Immunity Act discussed in part IV below.30  
III. Development of the restrictive doctrine in relation to enforcement in 
domestic law 
By the late 1970s, the UK, the US and some European states had moved to an 
acceptance of the restrictive doctrine both in respect of suit and enforcement. 
What follows is a brief examination of the treatment of the commercial activity 
and the commercial purposes tests in the laws of a number of important 
commercial jurisdictions. 
A. Common law jurisdictions: The USA and Australia 
The US Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the FSIA) takes a broadly similar 
approach to that of the UK SIA in limiting enforcement against assets in use for 
commercial purposes , does not define “commercial activity”31 and requires a 
connection between the asset and the underlying claim, a condition not found in 
the English statute. Section 1610 of the FSIA provides that : “(a) The property 
in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity in the 
United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from 
execution . . . if –. . . (2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity 
upon which the claim is based….” 
                                                          
29
 Ibid., para 119. 
30
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 article 31 (2). Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and 
Practice Cambridge University Press 2002 pp188-ϭϴϵ; ‘iĐhaƌd GaƌdiŶeƌ, ͞UN CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ “tate IŵŵuŶitǇ: 
Foƌŵ aŶd FuŶĐtioŶ͟ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ ϱϱ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 407. Note also that Article 21 of 
UNCSI which lists property which is not to be attached includes property forming part of the cultural heritage 
of the state. According to The Guardian newspaper the Greek government is threatening to attach German 
property in Greece to compensate victims of the Second World War who have been awarded compensation by 
a Greek court. Holiday homes of German citizens will apparently be targeted. Obviously as a matter of 
international law that would be indefensible (they are not state assets apart from anything else) but this 
recent activity points to the increased interest in attaching assets to meet alleged state liabilities.  Accessed on 
16
th
 March 20115 at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/german-anger-over-greek-demand-
for-war-reparations. “ee also “tefaŶ WagstǇl ͞Gƌeeks fiŶd support for German reparations claims — in 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͟ Financial Times 17 March 2015 at: http://on.ft.com/1O38jnI. Accessed 17 March 2015. 
31
 US FSIA 1976; but at the time of enactment theƌe ǁas aŶ estaďlished ͞judiĐial͟ ǀiew on the meaning of 
͞ĐoŵŵeƌĐial͟: see Republic of Argentina v Weltover 504 US 607 (1992) 612-613. 
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A number of cases in the US courts about immunity from suit have dealt with 
the meaning of “commercial” and their approach has been followed in cases 
involving immunity from enforcement. The 1992 US Supreme Court case of 
Republic of Argentina v Weltover   dwelt on the distinction between the public 
and private acts of the state, which the courts have used as  a focus in deciding 
if an act is commercial or not.32 While it is obvious that “any activity of a 
sovereign is non-commercial in some sense”33, the Supreme Court in Weltover 
found that issuing bonds was a commercial activity even though they were 
issued as part of plan to stabilize the Argentinian currency. They were thus 
issued “in connection with a commercial activity” under Section1605 (a) (2) 
despite their purpose.34 The case had an important effect on sovereign debt 
litigation by removing immunity from suit for public offerings of sovereign 
debt, distressed or otherwise. More recently the focus has shifted to 
enforcement decisions.35 
In enforcement actions, the US courts initially focused on the nature of the 
property and whether it was of a type to support sovereign functions, an 
approach fixed on nature rather than purpose. In Connecticut Bank of 
Commerce v Republic of Congo, the Fifth Circuit however stressed the words 
“used for commercial purposes” in Section 1610(a). Those words led the court 
to conclude that “[what] matters, under the statute is not how [the foreign state] 
made its money, it is how it spends it.”36 The focus on “use” was confirmed in 
Walker International Holdings Ltd. V Republic of Congo where, in the event, 
the absence of any evidence of use at all in the United States prevented 
enforcement37. Subsequent cases have confirmed the narrow focus on use for a 
commercial activity. Past use can be relevant given the statutory language but, 
mere fact of acquisition of the asset using commercial means, does not ensure 
                                                          
32
 Ibid., p. 264 
33
 JoŶathaŶ BlaĐkŵaŶ aŶd ‘ahul Mukhi, ͞The EǀolutioŶ of ModeƌŶ “oǀeƌeigŶ Deďt LitigatioŶ: Vultuƌes, Alteƌ 
Egos, aŶd otheƌ Legal FauŶa͟ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ 73 Law and Contemporary Problems 47 at p 52. 
34
 Republic of Argentina v Weltover 504 US 607 (1992). Fox and Webb (n.2) p. 261 where it is stated that the 
US decision in Weltover ďǇ shiftiŶg the foĐus fƌoŵ͟ ĐoŵŵeƌĐial tƌaŶsaĐtioŶ foƌ pƌofit... to ...ĐoŶduĐt in the 
ŵaŶŶeƌ of a pƌiǀate peƌsoŶ... ďƌiŶgs the ƌestƌiĐtiǀe doĐtƌiŶe Đloseƌ to the Điǀil laǁ ĐƌiteƌioŶ͟. 
35
 Republic of Argentina v Weltover 504 US 607 (1992). See the discussion in Blackman and Mukhi (n. 33) at pp. 
52-54. 
36
 Connecticut Bank of Commerce v Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240 (2002) at 251. See also more recently 
Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v Grenada, F 3d WL 4773451 C.A.2 (2014)  relied on in Firebird 
Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru [2014] NSWCA 360 at para 175 (see n. 46 below). 
37
 395 F.3d 229 (2004) at 336. 
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that the test is satisfied.38  The US courts have struggled (as they have in the 
UK) to apply the legislative language consistently in all situations particularly 
where the asset may have or have had a number of different uses. The Fifth 
Circuit in Alf Cap v Republic of Congo tried to summarise the correct test as 
follows: “[U]nder the FSIA foreign property retains its immunity protection 
where its commercial uses, considered holistically and in context, (italics added) 
are bona fide exceptions to its otherwise non-commercial use”.39 The “holistic” 
approach and the reference to “context” mirror the approach of English courts 
discussed below at part IV.  
Argentina’s default in 2001 led to attempts to enforce against its assets in a 
number of jurisdictions. In EM Ltd v Republic of Argentina  creditors sought to 
block a payment by Argentina’s Central Bank to the IMF and to attach Central 
Bank funds held in the Federal Reserve Bank. This was refused by the Second 
Circuit in New York on the basis that Argentina itself did not have a proprietary 
interest in the funds, the Central Bank being a separate entity40. The court 
however further found that monies used to repay the IMF, would not be “used 
for a commercial activity” for a number of reasons to do with the nature of the 
relationship between the Republic and the IMF. The court stated that “[b]ecause 
a nation state's borrowing relationship with the IMF takes place outside of the 
commercial marketplace, it cannot be considered “commercial” in nature” 41. 
Membership of the IMF is limited to sovereign states and the court 
distinguished Weltover  principally on the basis that the IMF is an international 
                                                          
38
 See Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v Republic of Argentina 584 F.2d 120 (2009) at 131. The case involved an 
attempt to execute against social security funds.   
39
 383 F 3d 240 (2004) at 369. See also Yang (n.2) pp. 365-6 where he discusses the Af-Cap litigation generally 
including Af-Cap v. Chevron, US, 475 F.3d 1080 (2007) at 1087.  Ros, who is pro-creditor, refers to the Chevron 
deĐisioŶ as haǀiŶg ͞further cabined the scope of attachable property in …, in which it held that tax and royalty 
oďligatioŶs Đould Ŷot ďe attaĐhed ďeĐause theǇ ďeloŶged to CheǀƌoŶ ǁho had Ŷegotiated foƌ a ͞pƌepaid͟ 
contract with the Congo and therefore the revenue streams were not for a commercial purpose͟ of the state 
itself. Pablo M. ‘os, ͞The Elliott AĐƌopolis? AŶ AŶalǇsis of IŶdiǀidual Cƌeditoƌ “oǀeƌeigŶ Deďt EŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt 
MeĐhaŶisŵs͟ Haƌǀaƌd Laǁ “Đhool “pƌiŶg ϮϬϭϭ aǀailaďle at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/education/llm/2010---2011/ros.pdf, accessed 5 February 
2015 p30.  
40
 473 F.3d 463 (2007) at B available at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1147600.html accessed 15 
March 2015. 
41
 Ibid., at C. 
12 
 
organisation and its relationship with its state borrowers is not governed by 
domestic law.42  
The vulture fund (also known as a distressed debt fund) NML Capital Ltd has 
been a determined litigant. NML acquired Argentinian sovereign bonds in 2000 
pursuant to contracts governed by New York law.  NML obtained judgment for 
$284 million in 2006 and has tried to enforce that judgment ever since in 
different jurisdictions wherever it can locate Argentinian assets. It has also 
sought court orders injuncting Argentina from paying out pursuant to the 
restructuring. Argentina has argued that despite the waivers of immunity set out 
in the original bonds, the US FSIA’s enforcement provisions still limit property 
eligible for execution and what can be subject to discovery. The Supreme Court 
in 2014 found that FSIA did not limit a court’s discretion to order discovery and 
that the protection for state assets under the statute was limited to assets in the 
US.43  
NML’s attempts to enforce against Argentinian assets worldwide exemplify 
why the law in this area needs to be scrutinised and one is left wondering if this 
approach is sustainable or in the interests of international law and relations.44 
The trend in the US in favour of enforcement measures and away from the 
careful retention of immunity specified in customary international law 
demonstrated by these recent cases has not been universally endorsed. Ghanaian 
and French courts have rejected attempts to enforce against a vessel owned by 
Argentina and against fiscal and social security debts respectively.45  
The “holistic” or “contextual” approach to the interpretation of state immunity 
statutes is echoed in Australia. The New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
                                                          
42
 Ibid., at C . The Đouƌt stated that the state͛s ďoƌƌoǁiŶg ƌelatioŶship ǁith the IMF is ͞Ŷot goǀeƌŶed ďǇ a 
͞gaƌdeŶ-ǀaƌietǇ deďt iŶstƌuŵeŶt͟ ;ĐitiŶg WeltoverͿ ďut iŶstead ďǇ the ‘epuďliĐ͛s tƌeatǇ oďligatioŶs to the 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal oƌgaŶizatioŶ…͟.  
43
 Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S.Ct.2250 (2014) and Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, 
Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).  
44
 For a good analysis of the Argentinean litigation in the Supreme Court see KaƌeŶ HalǀeƌsoŶ Cƌoss, ͞U“ 
“upƌeŵe Couƌt DeŶies Ceƌtioƌaƌi aŶd Affiƌŵs DisĐoǀeƌǇ iŶ BoŶdholdeƌ LitigatioŶ agaiŶst AƌgeŶtiŶa͟ A“IL IŶsight 
(Http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/23/us-supreme-court-denies-certiorari-and-affirms-discovery-
bondholder). 
45
 See the decision of the Supreme Court of Ghana granting immunity to an Argentinean tall ship NML sought 
to attach. Decision No.J5/10/2013 of the Supreme Court of Ghana in the matter of The Republic v High Court 
(Comm) Accra ex parte Attorney General (NML Capital Ltd. and the Republic of Argentina as interested parties). 
See below for discussion on French decision.  The attempt by NML to obtain redress in the English courts 
turned on issues as to the recognition of foreign judgments: NML Capital v Argentina, [2011] UKSC 31; [2011] 2 
A.C. 495; [2011] 3 W.L.R. 273; [2011] 4 All E.R. 1191; [2012] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 1081.  
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Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru denied attempts by the 
holders of bearer bonds, guaranteed by Nauru, to recover against assets of the 
Republic which attempts nearly resulted in the state’s default46.  Garnishee 
orders made in respect of a Japanese judgment in favour of the bond holders 
were removed from 30 of Nauru’s bank accounts with commercial banks in 
Australia. The court held that the funds in the accounts were not used for 
substantially commercial purposes and, therefore, did not satisfy the 
commercial purposes test in the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 
198547. Because of the speed with which the litigation was brought the evidence 
was sparse. The certificate of the Consul General under s 41 referred to the 
accounts being used for a variety of governmental purposes including its 
nationalised airline and schools. Certificates under the Australian Act are not 
conclusive and the court had to decide the use to which the funds in each 
account was to be put. The judges, on appeal, unanimously found that the uses 
were sovereign not commercial. “Commercial purpose” is not defined in the 
Australian legislation but Bathurst CJ in discussing the correct approach to 
interpretation stated that “[a]n analytical approach that focuses on the nature of 
the legislation to ensure a proper legal characterisation must be conducted.”48  
 
B. Civil law states  
Broadly speaking European states (whether parties to ECSI or not) also 
distinguish between immunity from suit and enforcement. Most European 
jurisdictions follow the general international law consensus that assets available 
for measures of constraint need to be used for non-governmental purposes.49. 
                                                          
46
 [2014] NSWCA 360 at para 178. The statements about the garnishee orders were strictly obiter as the court 
concluded following the UK Supreme Court in NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina [2011] UKSC 31; [2011] 
2AC 495 that the registration of the judgment (in this case of a Japanese court) did not concern a commercial 
transaction for the purpose of the immunity from suit provisions of the Australian legislation. 
47
 [2014] NSWCA 360 at para 178.  
48
 Ibid., at para 173.The court was very aware of the individual circumstances of Nauru and in determining 
ǁhetheƌ the fuŶds ǁeƌe ďeiŶg used foƌ a ĐoŵŵeƌĐial puƌpose the Đouƌt Ŷoted Nauƌu͛s ƌeŵote loĐatioŶ aŶd 
sŵall geogƌaphiĐal size aŶd populatioŶ ǁhiĐh ͞ƌeŶdeƌ the pƌoǀisioŶ of ŵaŶǇ ĐoŵŵeƌĐial seƌǀiĐes 
uncommercial for pƌiǀate eŶtities ͞ Ibid., para 176. This is a further indication of the importance of context. 
49
 ECSI does not as such remove immunity from enforcement but permits states parties to make declarations 
allowing for reciprocal enforcement measures to be taken. See article 24 ECSI. See generally August Reinisch, 
͞EuƌopeaŶ Đouƌt pƌaĐtiĐe ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg state iŵŵuŶitǇ fƌoŵ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt ŵeasuƌes͛ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ EJIL 803 and Fox and 
Webb, (n. 2) p 485-486. European laws and lawyers tend to speak in terms of non-governmental purposes 
while common law lawyers and statutes refer to commercial purposes-the two are not necessarily 
interchangeable but are so treated for the purposes of the argument here about the commercial purposes 
test. 
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Germany is the source of two historically significant decisions- The Empire of 
Iran Case 1963 on the meaning of jure gestionis50 and the Philippine Embassy 
Bank Account Case 1977 which looked at execution. The Philippine case drew 
a strict distinction between execution against state property in use for sovereign 
public purposes and that in use for commercial purposes.51 
Recent decisions in a number of jurisdictions suggest that the courts struggle 
with applying the test, just as courts do in common law jurisdictions For 
example, the French Cour de Cassation, the highest civil court, refused to allow 
creditors to attach Argentinian assets consisting of fiscal and social security 
debts, owed to Argentina by branches of French companies, including Air 
France. The court found that, as these types of assets, which included bank 
accounts, were not specifically mentioned in the relevant contractual waiver of 
immunity from enforcement, they remained immune from attachment. The 
decision confirms the French approach to the removal of immunity from state 
assets - being that “public assets” remain protected. Public assets are those used 
or indeed to be used for public ends which rather begs the question when is a 
governmental use not public?  This focus on use mirrors the decisions in US and 
English courts, but leaves one to question what exactly is the use of a bank 
account, given that money is fungible. The French court went on to find that the 
origin of the assets could be material to determining their use - not the approach 
taken by the English courts as discussed below.52  
European practice is not uniform and states such as Belgium and Italy, which 
were at the forefront of the restrictive doctrine in the context of suit, were, 
despite this, slower to remove immunity from enforcement. Switzerland (and 
Belgium) have stood apart in favouring restricting immunity from enforcement 
where immunity from suit has been denied. The Swiss do nonetheless retain 
                                                          
50
 In the Empire of Iran case, 45 I.L.R. 57 , 80 it was stated that: "As a means for determining the distinction 
between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis one should rather refer to the nature of the state transaction or 
the resulting legal relationships, and not to the motive or purpose of the state activity. It thus depends on 
whether the foreign state has acted in exercise of its sovereign authority, that is in public law, or like a private 
person, that is in private law.͟ 
51
 The Philippine Embassy case, German Federal Const. Ct, 13 December 1977, 46BverfGE 342; 65 ILR 146. 
52
La Societe NML Capital v Republique Argentine,   Arrêt n° 395 du 28 mars 2013 (11-10.450) - Cour de 
cassation - Première chambre civile - ECLI:FR:CCASS:2013:C100395; discussed in Clifford Chance Briefing Note 
Apƌil ϮϬϭϯ, ͞EŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt AgaiŶst “tate Assets: FƌaŶĐe͛s Latest CoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the AƌgeŶtiŶiaŶ “aga͟; aǀailaďle 
at http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2013/04/enforcement_againststateassetsfranceslates.html; last 
accessed on 4 February 2015. 
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immunity in the case where assets have been “allocated for the performance of 
acts of sovereignty”.53  
C. The UK approach to immunity generally  
1. Immunity from suit and enforcement 
The absolute doctrine of immunity from suit and enforcement applied in the UK 
as a rule of common law until the late 1970s when, almost simultaneously, the 
House of Lords changed the common law rule  and Parliament adopted the UK 
State Immunity Act 1978 (in force 22 November 1978) 54. The SIA applies in 
most cases decided today.55  
SIA 78, which established the statutory basis for restrictive immunity, adopts a 
very clear “nature” test for removing immunity from suit in contractual, and 
most other commercial disputes. SIA section 3 sets out the rules for commercial 
transactions. It removes state immunity in respect of contracts for the sale of 
goods or services made or to be performed in the UK and other commercial 
transactions as defined.56 Sections 13 and 14 deal with measures of enforcement 
including seizure of state assets and preserve immunity for all but property “for 
the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes”57. A 
commercial purpose means a purpose for which the transactions and activities 
listed in section 3 (3), as commercial transactions, are carried out.58  
                                                          
53
 “ee August ‘eiŶisĐh, ͞EuƌopeaŶ Đouƌt pƌaĐtiĐe ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg state iŵŵuŶitǇ fƌoŵ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt ŵeasuƌes,͛ 
(2006) EJIL 803, 810 fn 43. Note that Sir John Donaldson in Alcom v Republic of Colombia [1980] QB 629 in the 
Court of Appeal (which found against the state) looked at other end of telescope - ͞If the state is aŵeŶaďle to 
the jurisdiction of the English courts in accordance with that provision (section 3(1)) there seems no logical 
ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ its ŵoŶeǇ should Ŷot ďe attaĐhaďle iŶ satisfaĐtioŶ of a judgŵeŶt͟ pϱ. See also Yang, (n.2) p. 370-
ϯϳϯ aŶd O͛Keefe, ;Ŷ.2) p. 288 and 68-70. See Belgian case of NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina, Brussels 
Court of Appeal, RG No, 2009/AR/3338, 21 June specifically about waiver.  
54
 UK “tate IŵŵuŶitǇ AĐt ϭϵϳϴ ;͞“IA͟Ϳ; State immunity is a preliminary procedural plea but by pleading 
immunity a state is not deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction. A court is bound to raise immunity if the 
parties do not. As soon as immunity is raised proceedings must be halted to give consideration to the plea. 
This article does not consider issues of waiver-either with respect to suit or enforcement-which may be very 
significant in litigation today. 
55
 Notable exceptions include the activities of foreign troops in the UK - see Holland v Lampen Wolfe [2000] 1 
WLR 1573; [2000] 3 All.ER 833. 
56
 SIA s 3. 
57
 SIA s 13(4); the language used in sections 13 and 14 was debated at Bill stage in the House of Lords where 
there was a general desire to curtail immunity and to allow enforcement. The final draft of the legislation 
probably did not go as far as some, including Lord Wilberforce and Lord Denning, would have liked and did not 
restrict the doctrine in relation to injunctions as Lord Denning had done in Trendtex itself.  Hansard, HL 
Vol.389, ser.5, cc 1491-1540 (March 23, 1978). 
58
 SIA s 17(1). 
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Under SIA 78 section 3(3) “commercial transaction” means— 
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services;(b) any loan or other 
transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or indemnity in 
respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation; and(c) any 
other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial, 
professional or other similar character) into which a State enters or in which it 
engages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority;…” 
Section 3(3) thus covers a wide range of activity but excludes transactions into 
which a state enters or in which it engages in the exercise of sovereign authority 
other than sales of goods or services or in respect of a financial obligation.59  
The argument being made here is that the test for determining the boundaries of 
enforcement against state assets needs to be re-examined as it can lead to results 
damaging to international relations. Recent English cases have indicated that, by 
using “context”, judges have come to decisions favouring states when a 
technical application of the statutory language might have favoured the creditor. 
This use of “context” is not without precedent and was formulated by the House 
of Lords in the case which determined the boundaries at common law of the 
restrictive doctrine in respect of immunity from suit. It is necessary to look 
closely at that decision. 
2. The common law test of immunity from suit 
Just as the SIA was entering into force, the House of Lords unanimously 
endorsed the restrictive doctrine of immunity from suit in I Congreso del 
Partido (decided in 1981 but on pre-SIA facts)60. Lord Wilberforce, with whom 
all their Lordships agreed, defined the common law test as one of determining 
the nature of the act in the context, permitting a court to look beyond nature 
alone61. The test for immunity from suit under section 3 of the SIA makes no 
mention of context  but Lord Wilberforce expressly incorporated it into the 
common law test he established in I Congreso. The crucial question, then for 
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 SIA s 3(3) 
60
 Playa Larga (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) Appellants v I Congreso del Partido (Owners) 
Respondents Marble Islands (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) Appellants v Same Respondents (the I 
Congreso)
60
 [1983] 1 A.C. 244, [1981] 3 WLR 328. Although Lord Denning had adopted the restrictive doctrine 
in Trendtex this was not consistent with precedent and a House of Lords case was needed to firmly establish 
the restrictive doctrine as a rule of common law. Only the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) can overturn 
existing precedent.  
61
 His exact formulation of the test is cited below. See n. 63. 
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Lord Wilberforce, was what was the “act” the context of which would be 
determinative. 
The I Congreso case concerned breaches of contract which arose when cargoes 
of sugar despatched for sale from Cuba by sea were diverted from their Chilean 
destinations, on the orders of the Cuban government, after the overthrow by 
General Pinochet of the, democratically elected, Chilean President Allende. The 
initial purchase and shipment of the sugar were clearly commercial transactions 
but the breach of contract was driven purely by political motives. Lord 
Wilberforce believed that the purpose of the breach had to be considered in 
deciding immunity from suit and hence crafted a test that requires courts to look 
at the nature of the transaction in the context of the facts which includes the 
manner of the breach. The House of Lords were unanimous in adopting the test 
as formulated by Lord Wilberforce and immunity was denied to Cuba, although 
somewhat ironically Lord Wilberforce dissented in respect of one of the 
cargoes. 62 
With respect to the then developing doctrine of restrictive immunity in 
international law, Lord Wilberforce stated : ”The conclusion which emerges is 
that in considering, under the "restrictive" theory whether state immunity should 
be granted or not, the court must consider the whole context in which the claim 
against the state is made, with a view to deciding whether the relevant act(s) 
upon which the claim is based, should, in that context, be considered as fairly 
within an area of activity, trading or commercial, or otherwise of a private law 
character, in which the state has chosen to engage, or whether the relevant act(s) 
should be considered as having been done outside that area, and within the 
sphere of governmental or sovereign activity.”63 
In elaborating on the distinction between acts jure imperii and those jure 
gestionis Lord Wilberforce approved the first instance judge’s formulation 
(while disagreeing with the result) to the effect that "... it is not just that the 
purpose or motive of the act is to serve the purposes of the state, but that the act 
is of its own character a governmental act, as opposed to an act which any 
private citizen can perform."64 
                                                          
62
I Congreso (n.60), p. 257 B-C. and see headnote. 
63
 Ibid., p. 267.  
64
 Ibid., p. 268,  citing Robert Goff J; Lord Wilberforce also cites the German Empire of Iran case with approval 
see n. 50. 
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By relying on the public/private dichotomy more familiar to continental 
lawyers65 and heavily on “context”, Lord Wilberforce introduced into the 
common law test an element of purpose omitted from the relevant provisions of 
the SIA 78. He was unconvinced that his test was any kind of attack on state 
sovereignty commenting that it was “neither a threat to the dignity of that State, 
nor any interference with its sovereign functions.”66  
A number of English cases involving immunity from suit, where SIA 78 has not 
applied, have considered the “nature in context” test. Notable are the judgment 
of Hoffmann LJ in the Court of Appeal in Littrell v. United States of America 
(No. 2) and the House of Lords decision in Holland v Lampen-Wolfe, both cases 
about adjudicative immunity relating to US forces stationed in the UK.67 These 
cases are worth considering as they illustrate how context can be used to favour 
the state and preserve immunity.  
Littrell illustrated how context is to be identified and in doing so highlighted the 
flexibility of the concept.  Hoffmann LJ (as he then was) said: 
“The context in which the act took place was the maintenance by the United 
States of a unit of the United States Air Force in the United Kingdom. This 
looks about as imperial an activity as could be imagined. But it would be facile 
to regard this context as determinative of the question. Acts done within that 
context could range from arrangements concerning the flights of the bombers - 
plainly jure imperii - to ordering milk for the base from a local dairy or careless 
driving by off-duty airmen on the roads of Suffolk. Both of the latter would 
seem to me to be jure gestionis, fairly within an area of private law activity. I do 
not think that there is a single test or ‘bright line’ by which cases on either side 
can be distinguished. Rather, there are a number of factors which may 
characterise the act as nearer to or further from the central military activity… 
                                                          
65
 The prevailing view in England at the tiŵe ǁas that of Pƌofessoƌ Haƌloǁ ͞Because the truth is that the 
"public/private" classification which we are seeking to encapsulate is wholly irrelevant to the organisation of 
modern society.͟ Haƌloǁ, ͞PuďliĐ aŶd Pƌiǀate Laǁ: DefiŶitioŶ ǁithout a DistiŶĐtioŶ͟ ;ϭϵϴϬͿ ϰϯ MLR 241 
66
 I Congreso (n.60) p. 262.   
67
 Littrell v. United States of America (No. 2) [1995] 1 W.L.R. 82, [1994] 4 All E.R. 203 concerned the provision of 
medical services on a US armed forces base in England and found that the plaintiff could not bring an action 
for personal injuries against the US Government as it was immune from suit; Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 
WLR 1573; [2000] 3 All ER 833 involved a libel claim brought by an instructor at a US military base arising out 
complaints about her teaching set out in  a memorandum sent by an education services officer. The court 
upheld the claim to immunity. 
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Some acts are wholly military in character, some almost entirely private or 
commercial and some in between.”68 
In Holland v Lampen-Wolfe the Lords followed Littrell and Lord Millett in 
particular cited Hoffmann LJ with approval. In applying the “nature in context” 
test, Lord Millet upheld immunity from suit in a defamation claim at common 
law by looking at the context. He also reached the same conclusion in applying 
SIA section 3 by narrowly interpreting the statutory words “relating to”69. This 
is in part the approach that preserved immunity from enforcement in the 
SerVaas case to be discussed below. 70 
 
IV. English immunity from enforcement cases decided under the SIA 
It will be recalled that, under s 13 of the UK SIA, state assets remain immune 
from enforcement action unless (1) they are “in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes” being those purposes referred to in s 3(3) or (2) the state 
consents (by waiver or otherwise). S 13 also prohibits specific enforcement, 
pre-judgment attachment, injunctions, freezing orders and orders for 
discovery71. Special rules protect a state’s central bank (s 14 (4)) and although 
diplomatic bank accounts are not specifically protected, the statute was 
interpreted narrowly to preserve the immunity of embassy bank accounts in  
Alcom v The Republic of Columbia72, the first of the important English cases 
about enforcement against state assets to be considered here. 
 
A. Alcom v the Republic of Colombia 
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 Littrell (n.67) p.95.  
69
 Holland v Lampen-Wolfe (n. 67), p. 1587.  Lord Millett found that the proceedings did not relate to the 
underlying commercial transaction that was the contract for the supply of educational services. The claim was 
in defamation made in a separate memorandum. Lord Hope, in agreeing with Lord Millett, stated the test as 
folloǁs: ͞it is the nature of the act that determines whether it is to be characterised as jure imperii or jure 
gestionis. The process of characterisation requires that the act must be considered in its context͟ at p ϭϱϳϳ C. 
This approach was cited with approval in Arab Republic of Egypt v Gamal-Eldin and Another [1996] I.C.R. 13 
where Mummery LJ uses the context test in connection with an employment dispute. 
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 SerVaas (n.12Ϳ p. ϲϬϵ  ǁheƌe Loƌd Claƌke Đites the distiŶĐtioŶ dƌaǁŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͞ƌelatiŶg to͟ aŶd ͞iŶ use foƌ͟ 
by the US Judge Garza in Connecticut Bank of Commerce v Republic of Congo 309 F 3d 240 (2002)  (US Court of 
Appeals, 5th Cir, Texas). 
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 The position on injunctions in the US courts is somewhat different. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier and Anna 
GelpeƌŶŶ, ͞IŶjuŶĐtioŶs iŶ “oǀeƌeigŶ Deďt LitigatioŶ͟ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϯϭ Yale J. on Reg 189. 
72
  Alcom [1984] AC 580 p.580-606. 
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In Alcom, the House of Lords interpreted s13 restrictively and refused to permit 
a bank account of the Embassy of the Republic Colombia to be attached to meet 
a judgment debt. While some of the funds in the account were used to pay 
commercial debts, their use was mixed. The House of Lords concluded that the 
legislation excluded attachment unless the account was “solely” in use for 
commercial purposes73. The SIA does not include the word “solely” but the 
decision is consistent with international law74 . In Alcom, Lord Diplock’s 
analysis of the words in the SIA suggests that he was aware of the international 
sensitivity about the attachment of a foreign state’s bank account75 and arguably 
indicates that the “commercial use” test in respect of enforcement against state 
assets is closer to “purpose in context” than mere commercial purpose.  
Lord Diplock crucially suggested that a state’s bank account used to run an 
embassy would not be “in use for commercial purposes” if one adopted the 
ordinary meaning of such a phrase. He found, however, that the SIA, in 
requiring a court to determine “commercial purpose” by looking at the meaning 
of “commercial transaction” in s 17 (and thus s 3 (3)), could result in a removal 
of immunity and hence attachment of the account in such an instance. It was 
only Lord Diplock’s adroit interpretation of s 13 (4) in light of the context and 
the other sections of the act that permitted the introduction of the concept of 
“solely in use”, thus preserving immunity.  
It is crucial in these cases to note that s 13(5) of the English statute provides that 
a Head of Mission's certificate that property is not in use or intended for use by 
or on behalf of the state for commercial purposes is sufficient evidence of that 
fact unless the contrary is proved. The certificate of the Head of Mission in 
Alcom was very clear and, to Lord Diplock, conclusive that the bank account 
fell outside s 13(4). This will of course often be the case as discussed in part IV. 
B below. It will be hard, even if not impossible to obtain evidence to rebut the 
Head of Mission’s assertion, and so the claimant is greatly disadvantaged in 
trying to argue in favour of enforcement and against immunity. 
On context, however, Lord Diplock continued: 
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 Ibid., p. 604 D. (subject to de minimus exceptions) 
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 See Part II B. above on the position in international law. Diplomatic bank accounts are excluded from 
enforcement under art 21 of UNCSI. 
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 CedƌiĐ ‘ǇŶgaeƌt, ͞EŵďassǇ BaŶk AĐĐouŶts aŶd “tate IŵŵuŶitǇ fƌoŵ EǆeĐutioŶ: DoiŶg JustiĐe to the FiŶaŶĐial 
IŶteƌests of Cƌeditoƌs͟ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Ϯϲ Leiden Journal of International Law pp. 73-ϴϴ aŶd August ‘eiŶisĐh, ͞EuƌopeaŶ 
court practice concerning state immunity from enforcement measures͟ (2006) EJIL 803. 
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“My Lords, the decisive question for your Lordships is whether in the context of 
the other provisions of the Act to which I have referred, and against the 
background of its subject matter, public international law, the words "property 
which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes," 
appearing as an exception to a general immunity to the enforcement jurisdiction 
of United Kingdom courts accorded by section 13(2) to the property of a foreign 
state, are apt to describe the debt represented by the balance standing to the 
credit of a current account kept with a commercial banker for the purpose of 
meeting the expenditure incurred in the day-to-day running of the diplomatic 
mission of a foreign state.”76  
He found that the context, and the background, did not so describe such a debt 
and therefore reached a conclusion which, no doubt seemed just to him, and 
which, fortunately for the British Government, was diplomatically correct. So 
was he just doing what was appropriate? It is precisely this use of the wider 
context or background of international law considerations of comity and 
sovereign equality that motivated Lord Clarke in SerVaas 77  and arguably 
Aikens J in AIG Capital Partners v Republic of Kazakstan 78  and Stanley 
Burnton LJ in AIC Ltd v The Federal Government of Nigeria and the Attorney 
General of the Federation of Nigeria .79There appears to be emerging a “purpose 
in context” test. 
David Lloyd Jones writing at the time about Alcom contrasted the focus on 
nature in s 3 with that on purpose in s 13(4) and suggested that “if the courts are 
permitted to take a wide view of the purposes to which an asset is in use or 
intended for use, they may look to the ultimate as opposed to the immediate 
objective”80. It is not exactly clear what he meant but he seems to be warning 
that it was only because Lord Diplock adopted the “purpose in context” 
approach outlined above that the right result, in his view, was achieved. Lloyd 
Jones’s point was that the SIA needed to be amended to protect embassy bank 
accounts. It is argued here that the wider context should inform treatment of a 
wider class of asset than embassy bank accounts and supports the emerging 
development of a “purpose in context” test for attachment of assets.  
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 Ibid., p.603 H. 
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 SerVaas (n.12) at 607 E where Lord Clarke quotes Lord Diplock in Alcom at length. 
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 [2005] EWHC 2239 (Comm), [2005] All ER (D) 223, [2005] EWHC 2239 (Comm). 
79
 [2003] EWHC 1357 (Q.B.), [2003] All ER (D) 190. 
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 Daǀid LloǇd JoŶes, ͞“tate IŵŵuŶitǇ-EǆeĐutioŶ agaiŶst EŵďassǇ BaŶk AĐĐouŶts͟ ;ϭϵϴϰͿ ϰϯ CLJ 222, 224.   
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Cases since Alcom will now be analysed before a discussion of how Lord 
Clarke approached the commercial purposes test in SerVaas. 
B. Recent immunity cases relating to debt 
Immunity from enforcement of a debt owed to a state in the form of a bank 
account has been discussed in detail in four significant recent cases: AIC Ltd v 
The Federal Government of Nigeria81; AIG Capital Partners Inc v Republic of 
Kazakhstan (National Bank of Kazakhstan intervening)82; Orascom Telecom 
Holding SAE v Republic of Chad and another (Citibank NA, third party) 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development intervening)83; and 
SerVaas Inc v Rafidain Bank.84In all but Orascom the courts found in favour of 
immunity and against the creditor. In each case the language of SIA section 
13(4) was in dispute and the “use” of the relevant debt in issue.  
It is clear that a debt is “property” for the purposes of sections 13 and 1485 but, 
what emerges, is just how difficult it is to characterise the purpose of a debt. 
The test in domestic law has arguably evolved to take a greater account of 
context consistently with the international law approach, but the problem 
remains from which perspective context is to be considered: the creditor’s or the 
State’s? The recent decisions coming from the US suggest that it is the 
creditor’s while in England the focus has been more on the preservation of 
immunity from enforcement. 
 AIC Ltd v The Federal Government of Nigeria and the Attorney General of the 
Federation of Nigeria86 concerned, in part, 16 Nigerian state bank accounts with 
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 AIC, (n.79). 
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 AIG, (n.78). 
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 [2008] EWHC 1841 (Comm); [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 135. 
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 [2012] UKSC 40 and [2013] 1 A.C. 595. 
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 Field J in Taurus Petroleum Limited v State Oilmarketing Company [2013] EWHC 4495  at para 64 quoted 
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 AIC (n.79). See on this point the position under the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1986 applied in 
the Queensland Court of Appeal in Australian International Islamic College Board Inc. V Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia & Anor [2013] QCA 129.  
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HSBC which the Nigerian High Commissioner’s certificate (under s 13 (5) of 
SIA) claimed were not “in use” but “dormant”, no payments having been made 
in or out over 18 months. There was evidence of previous use of the accounts to 
pay for the purchase of books for Nigerian schools- a non-commercial use 
according to Stanley Burnton J (as he then was). There was also evidence of the 
accounts being used for scholarships, which was asserted not to be commercial 
but, without reasons being given. The judge stated that payments to third parties 
for goods or services supplied to government employees would be commercial 
but, payments by the government to the employees themselves would not be. 
No authority was cited87. The judge (who later decided with the majority in the 
Court of Appeal in SerVaas) made these fine distinctions and concluded that, 
even if there were relevant admissible evidence (which he did not accept there 
was), previous commercial use did not establish present or intended use. He did 
not give reasons.88 This reflects the approach used in the US Courts to the effect 
that the issue is not how the state made the money it is how it spends it.89   
AIG Capital Partners Inc v Republic of Kazakhstan (National Bank of 
Kazakhstan intervening)also held that immunity prevented enforcement, in a 
case concerning ABN AMRO bank accounts held in London beneficially for the 
state. The ratio of the case was that the funds were actually the property of the 
state’s central bank and therefore immune under s 14(4).  Aikens J, per curiam, 
found that the assets were not “in use or intended for use for commercial 
purposes”. He was not prepared to accept that because the funds were traded 
their “use” was commercial. “The dealings of the securities accounts must, in 
my view, be set against the background of the purpose of the global custody 
agreement …The securities accounts contain assets which are part of the 
national fund. In my view the dealings are all part of the overall exercise of 
sovereign authority by Kazakhstan.”90 This is an application of the evolving 
purpose in context test later approved by the Supreme Court in SerVaas. It has 
been criticised for being too favourable to states.91 
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Commentator David Gaukrodger puts the argument for creditors when he states: 
“The approach in AIG would also make the treatment of sovereign debtors and 
creditors markedly different. A State that raises funds in the sovereign debt 
market is now generally considered to engage in private activity even if the 
funds are destined for immediate public purposes. In contrast, under the 
reasoning in AIG, investment activity by an SWF [sovereign wealth fund] 
would benefit from immunity. Overall, successfully executing against foreign 
state property remains difficult for private parties. As an evidentiary matter, it 
can be difficult to obtain information to demonstrate that property is in 
commercial use. Where property can be located that is in commercial use, it 
frequently belongs to an SOE that is a different entity than the debtor and 
execution is rejected on the basis that it is an independent entity. While a 
unified approach to jurisdiction and execution would seem logical, the reality is 
that while jurisdiction has been substantially expanded, immunity from 
execution remains as “the last bastion of State immunity” in private law cases. 
There are a number of well-known cases where judgment creditors have spent 
many years in largely fruitless efforts in multiple jurisdictions to obtain 
satisfaction for judgments or arbitration awards. At the same time, factual data 
is lacking about the degree to which States evade their obligations; although 
States may take longer to honour their obligations, it may be the case that all but 
a few States do so.”92 
Orascom Telecom Holding SAE v Republic of Chad and another (Citibank NA, 
third party) (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
intervening) is the one case where the court was not prepared to let context 
determine the outcome. Burton J distinguished the decision of the court in AIG 
Capital Partners Inc v Republic of Kazakhstan (National Bank of Kazakhstan 
intervening) in finding that, because a bank account was being “operated” for 
the “purpose of a commercial transaction”, it did not attract immunity, despite 
the purpose of the transaction being to benefit the state. The account was set up 
to give effect to a mechanism required by the World Bank for the channelling of 
oil revenues to the repayment of sovereign loans. 93 The ratio of Burton J’s 
decision is that the “account was established, and has been operated, for the 
purposes of a commercial transaction, namely (i) so as to receive the proceeds 
of a contract for the supply of goods or services; and/or (ii) so as to be part of a 
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system specifically established for the purposes of (repayment of) loans by the 
World Bank to Chad.”94  
He reached this conclusion despite a certificate from the ambassador saying that 
the funds were not in commercial use on two grounds: 1) the certificate did not 
effectively cover the accounts in question and 2) that in any event Orascom had 
disproved the facts stated in the certificate.95 This case is unique in that the 
judge found that the certificate of the state as to use was not conclusive in that 
he accepted that the “contrary had been proved”. Evidence which contradicted 
the certificate was admitted and one could argue that this case is not out of line 
but simply decided on actual evidence of use not available in the other cases. 
No evidence as to use was forthcoming in AIG. What is significant is Burton J’s 
insistence on looking at the nature of the way in which the state had generated 
these funds and was going to use them. The seemingly sovereign purpose of the 
entire set-up was not decisive. He decided in effect that the use of international 
aid ultimately to pay for services was not a public/sovereign purpose. His 
decision is out of line and was criticised in SerVaas which is explored below.   
C. SerVaas Inc and the “purpose in context” test 
In the recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in SerVaas Inc v Rafidain Bank 
and others96, the commercial purposes test in SIA 78 section 13(4) was used, in 
relation to an application by the claimant, a judgment creditor of the Republic of 
Iraq, for a third party debt order (“TPDO”) in respect of assets of the Republic 
held in the defendant bank in London.97   
The claimant creditor, SerVaas, a company incorporated in Indiana, sought to 
enforce a foreign default judgment obtained against the Iraqi Ministry of 
Industry, in connection with a contract for the supply of equipment, machinery 
and related services for a state-owned factory in Iraq which, by November 2010, 
amounted to about US $ 35 million.98 
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SerVaas sought the TPDO against Rafidain Bank, in provisional liquidation in 
England, in relation to the debt payable by that bank to the Republic of Iraq by 
way of dividend under a scheme of arrangement relating to Iraq’s acquisition of 
the bank’s commercial debts (“the admitted claims”), pursuant to a debt 
restructuring agreed after the fall of Saddam Hussein. SerVaas did not 
participate in this scheme.99 To succeed, SerVaas had to persuade the court to 
unfreeze Rafidain’s assets and stop it paying out any monies in respect of the 
admitted claims (on which a dividend was due under the restructuring 
agreement)100. The chargé d'affaires and Head of Mission of the Embassy of 
Iraq in London certified that the admitted claims were not in use, and were not 
intended for use, for commercial purposes as defined in s 13 (4) and that Iraq 
intended to pay the dividends to the Development Fund for Iraq (the DFI), 
established by the United Nations Security Council. 
SerVaas agreed that the monies payable to Iraq under the restructuring scheme 
(which formed part of the admitted claims) were “property” within the meaning 
of the section; that the onus lay on SerVaas to show a real prospect that it could 
rebut the presumption created by the certificate; and that the debts were 
intended for use for sovereign and not commercial purposes. It argued however 
that “… the current use of the debt (i.e. the right to receive the monies) could 
only be ascertained from the underlying commercial transaction which would 
culminate in final payment of the debt. If Section 13(4) is to have any 
application to the vast majority of commercial debts at all (most of which will 
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by order of the court discharged from any legal obligation to pay the judgment debtor.͟ 
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not have an identified or identifiable use for the proceeds following satisfaction 
of the debt), it must be possible to describe a debt as being in use for some 
purpose. The only logical purpose which can be identified is the completion of 
the commercial transaction which gives rise to the debt itself. The current use of 
the Admitted Claims cannot be separated from the underlying transactions by 
which Iraq acquired those claims.”101 
The court was faced with the almost insuperable task of deciding the use of a 
debt. This had concerned Lord Diplock in Alcom when he said: 
“To speak of a debt as ‘being used or intended for use’ for any purposes by the 
creditor to whom the debt is owed involves employing ordinary English words 
in what is not their natural sense, even if the phrase ‘commercial purposes' is 
given the ordinary meaning of jure gestionis in contrast to jure imperii that is 
generally attributed to it in the context of rights to sovereign immunity in public 
international law; though it might be permissible to apply the phrase intelligibly 
to the credit balance in a bank account that was earmarked by the state for 
exclusive use for transactions into which it entered jure gestionis.”102  
Arnold J at first instance, and the majority of the Court of Appeal, in Servaas 
decided that the origin of the debts owed to creditors of the bank (which formed 
the admitted claims) was irrelevant- the commercial nature of the original debt 
did not answer the question as to its purpose at the relevant time. 103 
Lord Clarke in his leading judgment in the Supreme Court made the dichotomy 
very clear in stating that the question: 
“...is whether the nature of the origin of the debts is relevant to the question 
whether the property in question was in use for commercial purposes. In my 
opinion it is not. This conclusion is based upon the language of section 13(4). It 
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 Rix LJ dissenting in the Court of Appeal stated that ͞For the present, however, until the dividend is paid, the 
claim's obvious use and purpose, I would have thought, was to be the means by which the claim's owner, Iraq, 
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All ER (Comm) 527, para 74. 
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is also informed by the decision of the House of Lords in Alcom Ltd v Republic 
of Colombia [1984]  AC 580.”104 
He accepted that “the expression “in use for commercial purposes” should be 
given its ordinary and natural meaning having regard to its context (my italics)”. 
He also admitted that it was not an ordinary construction to conclude that a debt 
arising from a transaction was “in use” for that transaction.105 This did not 
however clarify what the use of a debt was. 
As a matter of statutory interpretation (similar to that adopted in Alcom), Lord 
Clarke narrowed the commercial purpose test in s 13(4) by adding the word 
“currently” to the language of the section. He said the task was to determine 
whether the bank accounts were “currently in use or intended for use” partly by 
contrasting that wording with the phrases “relates to” and “connected to” used 
in sections 3(1) and 10. In other words, the test required the court to determine 
the present use of the debt-not its origin or its ultimate purpose. 
In taking this approach to the commercial purposes test, Lord Clarke relied 
heavily on Alcom but also looked at the recent English cases discussed above, a 
recent Hong Kong case and US authority.106 SerVaas had conceded that the 
claims were intended to be used for sovereign purposes- but argued that their 
present use was commercial.107  
In summarising the legal position, Lord Clarke explicitly rejected Rix LJ’s 
dissent, in the Court of Appeal, to the effect that Iraq was simply holding the 
debt for the purpose of seeking payment of its claim …”like the holder of any 
commercial debt” and therefore that the matter should proceed to trial as it was 
arguable that the use was commercial under the statute.108 Lord Clarke 
disagreed and concluded as follows: “SerVaas cannot show that the debt is or 
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was earmarked (or in use) for being drawn down upon in order to satisfy 
commercial liabilities….The determinative feature, in my view, is the absence 
of any current or future commercial activity on the part of Iraq.”109  
These issues are clearly highly technical and one wonders what would happen 
in a case where monies generated by commercial transactions were simply 
going to be transferred back for use by the foreign state. Without the 
rescheduling dimension would that be use for a “non-commercial purpose” 
while held in the UK? The problem is whether it is correct to distinguish current 
use from origin in the absence of real evidence as to current use. The House of 
Lords in SerVaas and the US cases cited in SerVaas say so, but Rix LJ 
dissenting in the Court of Appeal in SerVaas, thought it was arguable and 
Burton J in Orascom said it was not.110  
 
V. Conclusion 
The commercial purposes test used in international law, and in the law of most 
states, to determine when a state asset may be attached to assist in the 
enforcement of a judgment may lead to difficult questions of interpretation and 
application. It is not always clear what the “use” of a state asset is and what 
state activities have “commercial purposes”. The issue is compelling in part 
because, as immunity from suit has been restricted, private creditors have 
increasingly sought to enforce against state assets. It has been argued here that, 
in general, domestic courts have been acutely aware of the need to protect 
sovereign assets from inappropriate seizure and have interpreted their domestic 
legislation accordingly. Domestic courts on the whole have been sensitive to the 
international effects of seizure of sovereign assets and been prepared to interpret 
statutory language by reference to the international context of the relevant 
litigation.  
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This review of recent English cases, against the backdrop of developments in 
other domestic courts and at the international level, has highlighted how 
difficult it can be to translate the commercial purposes test at a practical level. It 
has also questioned whether, in fact, the assets of foreign states should be 
exposed to seizure on the basis of such fine distinctions. The use of context has 
been seen to mitigate the legislative language in England, Australia and in the 
US but one is driven to ask whether the real distinction should be that between 
those state assets that form part of a restructuring or other sovereign programme 
(such as those associated with overseas aid projects) and those that do not. The 
jure gestionis/jure imperii dichotomy is hard to avoid and harder to translate 
into practicable judicial standards. Adding context to the statutory language, as 
Lords Wilberforce, Diplock and now Clarke have done, has tended to favour 
immunity and that may be no bad thing ultimately. The attempts by vulture 
funds to locate and enforce against Argentinian assets is highlighting that 
international cooperation is required and that a treaty on international 
insolvency may be the best way forward. The recent pursuit of Nauru in the 
Australian courts also sounds a warning. 
Not all private creditors are vulture funds however and the test for commercial 
purposes will remain relevant whatever happens at the international level in 
relation to sovereign debt defaults. The fine line between assets which can be 
used to meet a state’s debts and those that cannot will remain very important if 
seemingly difficult to draw.  
States have been able to depend on domestic judges being prepared to protect 
state assets by using interpretive techniques such as reliance on a contextual or 
holistic analysis but the approach taken in 2014 by the US Supreme Court in the 
NML litigation discussed above and cases such as Orascom in England reveal 
that this may not always be enough. So long as states do not honour their 
commitments creditors will be driven to attempt to enforce. As immunity from 
suit becomes even more limited there will be growing pressure to allow 
attachment of state assets and the time may have arrived for efforts to introduce 
an international regime for state bankruptcy or liquidation to be widened to 
encompass another look at the commercial purposes test.  
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